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Our system of law and government, combined with our complex social and
economic structure, necessitates the assigning of certain functions to ministerial
and administrative boards. Legislative power can be exercised more effectually
and more in accordance with the spirit of the constitution through delegation
than directly. This consideration should weigh against any rigid and un-
yielding application of the theory regarding the non-delegation of legislative
power. Such adherence to the doctrine would not be in step with the modern
trend of lodging control in a vast congeries of agencies. 2 2 Moreover, the
question of whether a commission is acting in an administrative or legislative
capacity is one of great nicety. The distinction has been made to rest upon
the exercise of discretion. 2 3 But it cannot be said that every grant of power
to executive or administrative boards involving the exercise ,of discretion
or judgment must be considered a delegation of legislative authority.2 4 The
discretion delegated to the State Board of Tax Commissioners in reviewing
the levy of a municipality seems to be a proper exercise of power and is
not a legislative act. Practical considerations make the objections of unlawful
delegation of legislative power more apparent than real. The board cannot
increase the tax; it may only affirm or decrease the levy fixed by local tax
officials. This cannot properly be objected to as an unlawful delegation of
legislative power. Boards exercising no legislative function may be delegated
duties in regard to taxation which are ministerial or administrative in nature.
2 5
The dissenting opinion in the principal case points to the evils which might
arise because of the power to limit the revenue which the municipal government
may raise by taxation. The fact that the power might be abused would seem
to be no reason for denying it. Where there is sufficient evidence of trans-
gressions, the board's functions and acts can be curtailed. The board is a
creature of the people through legislative enactment, and the people are not
obliged to continue its existence. It is submitted that the instant case is in line
with modern legal development and is sound in principle. B. S.
CONTRAcTs-DISCHARGE BY INCONSISTENT PROVISIONS OF SUBSEoUENT CONTRACT.
-Plaintiff, a public utility, operating under and in accordance with a franchise
granted by defendant city in 1899 and accepted by plaintiff, seeks recovery for
water furnished the city for the period between April 1, 1930, and June 30,
1931, at a rate provided in a contract entered into between said city and
plaintiff in 1919, the rates therein fixed being approved by the Public Service
Commission of Indiana. The original franchise was to run for a period of
mission (1921), 187 Ind. 53, 118 N. E. 531; City of Logansport v. Public
Service Commission (1931), 202 Ind. 523, 177 N. E. 249.2 2 See Frankfurter, Task of Administrative Law (1927), 75 U. of Pa. L.
Rev. 614; Freund, Standards of American Legislation, p. 302.
23 Cooley, Taxation (1924, 4th ed.), sec. 78; Whitfield, Legislative Powers
(1910), 20 Yale L. J. 87.
24 Southern Ry. Co. v. Hunt (1908), 42 Ind. App. 90, 83 N. E. 721; State
v. Board of Commissioners (1908), 170 Ind. 595, 85 N. E. 513; Egyptian
Transportation System v. Louisville & N. R. Co. (1926), 321 I1. 580, 152
N. E. 510.
25 People ex rel. Pexley v. Lodi H. S. Dist. (1899), 124 Cal. 694, 57 p. 660;
City of Little Rock v. Board of Improvements (1883), 42 Ark 152; Cooley,
Taxation (1924, 4th ed.), sec. 81.
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thirty years and was to be renewed for another such period if the city did not
elect to purchase the utility prior to the expiration of the thirty year period.
The second contract, made while the franchise was still in effect, was to last
for ten years, during which time the utility was to furnish the defendant with
water "under the franchise thereofore granted." The plaintiff has never
elected to purchase said utility. Held, the rates as provided in the original
franchise will control.1
As an ordinance granting a franchise and its subsequent acceptance by the
utility constitutes a binding contract,2 the parties thereto may at their pleasure
mutually modify it or substitute in its place a new contract.3 An interesting
question arises in the principal case in considering the effect of the second
contract upon the original franchise. Did it amount to a discharge of the
original contract in whole or in part, or did that contract still remain in force
in whole or in part? In this jurisdiction there seems to be a dearth of author-
ity on the question of formal requisites necessary to discharge a contract by
the provisions of a subsequent contract. In the determination of this question
it will, therefore, be well to look at the attitude taken by the courts of other
states.
Some courts have held that in order to discharge a contract by a subse-
quent contract on the same subject it is necessary that the fact of discharge be
clearly expressed in the substituted contract.4 However, this does not seem
to be the weight of authority. Most courts have held that a contract may
be treated as discharged or rescinded in the absence of an express agreement
of the parties.5 They have taken into consideration various factors upon
which to base their decisions. It has been held that where the intention of
the parties to discharge may be implied from the circumstances, then the
contract will be treated as abrogated.6 But other courts have been more
exacting and will declare a contract to be discharged only where the provisions
of a subsequent contract are so inconsistent with it that they cannot subsist
together.7 Still other courts have based their decisions on whether or not the
second contract depends upon a new consideration.8 It is evident, however,
1 Seymour Water Co. v. City of Seymour, Ind. (1935), 197 N. E. 701
(Ind.).
2 Muncie Natural Gas Co. v. City of Muncie (1903), 160 Ind. 97, 66
N. E. 436.
3 Commercial Acceptance Co. v. Walton (1931), 93 Ind. App. 136, 176
N. E. 244; Greensburg Water Co. v. Lewis (1920), 189 Ind. 439, 128 N. E.
103; 26 C. J. 1042, sec. 107.
4Metallograph Corporation v. Arma Engineering Co., Inc. (1923), 199
N. Y. S. 347.
5 Evans v. Jacobitz (1903), 72 P. 848, 67 Kans. 249; Holmes v. Robarts
(1929), 102 Cal. App. 53, 292 P. 519; LeMieux v. Cosgrove (1923), 155 Minn.
353, 193 N. W. 586; 6 R. C. L. 923, sec. 307.
, Evans v. Jacobitz (1903), 67 Kans. 249, 72 P. 848; LeMieux v. Cosgrove
(1923), 155 Minn. 353, 193 N. W. 586.
7 House Keeper Publishing Co. v. Swift (1899), 97 Fed. 290; Bridges v.
Sheldon (1880), 7 Fed. 17; Cornish et al. v. Suydam (1893), 99 Ala. 620,
13 So. 118; Bourn v. Dowdell (1897), 50 P. 695; Menefee v. Rankins (1914),
158 Ky. 78, 164 S. W. 365; Homire v. Stratton and Terstegg Co. (1914), 157
Ky. 822, 164 S. W. 67; Thompson v. Craft (1913), 85 At. 1107 (Pa.);
Sherman v. Sweeney (1902), 29 Wash. 321, 69 P. 1117; Boder v. Moore
(1917), 94 Wash. 221; 162 P. 8; 6 R. C. L. 923; 13 C. J. 603.
8 McKay v. Fleming (1913), 24 Colo. A. 380, 134 P. 159.
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that there must be a new consideration in order that the second instrument may
be a binding contract.
If the rule of inconsistency be adopted as the general one, the question
arises as to what extent a subsequent contract must be inconsistent with a former
one in order to operate as a discharge of it. The courts in substance say
that if the contracts are so inconsistent that they cannot subsist together, the
latter will be treated as a discharge of the former. 9  It is evident that the
application of this rule without correlative limitation would tend to make
the ground upon which discharge is granted very broad.
However, the courts do not use this rule as to inconsistency exclusively,
and, though stressed, there is usually attendant upon it a consideration of
the intention of the parties. Thus where the provisions of a contract have
been found inconsistent with those of a former one on the same subject,
it has been held that the second contract does not discharge the former,
except as to specific inconsistencies, if the parties did not intend the new
to* supersede the old in the entirety. The Kentucky court held that "a new
contract with reference to the subject matter of a former one does not
supersede the former and destroy its obligations except in so far as the new
one is inconsistent therewith, when it is evident from an inspection of the
contracts and from an examination of the circumstances that the parties
did not intend the new contract to supersede the old but intended it as
supplementary thereto.lO
The application of these principles to the instant ease is evident. If the
original franchise were discharged, it would be impossible for the plaintiff
to recover on the basis of the rate therein provided. This would leave no
contractually provided rate for water furnished after the lapse of the second
contract.
In the principal case it will be noted that the rates as provided in the
original franchise are inconsistent with those set out in the second contract.
However, the second contract states that the water is to be furnished "under
the franchise theretofore granted." This phrase was used by the court in
showing that the intention of the parties was that the original franchise was
not discharged, but the second contract was only supplemental to it. Hence
if it be true that this phrase does in fact represent the intention of the parties
when such interpretation is given it, the court was correct in stating that
the original franchise was still in effect.
There are two possible rationalizations for the proposition of applying
the rates of the original franchise. One rationale is that the original fran-
chise was completely discharged by the second contract, but that by the terms
of that contract the original franchise became a part of it, and the provisions
of the franchise, killed by its discharge, gained a new birth in the provisions
of the second contract. Hence the rates provided in the original franchise
were applicable at the expiration of the ten year period.
With regard to the theory of this latter rationale, which makes the second
contract the exclusive basis for determining the status of the parties, a
difficulty arises. In the same contract there would be two provisions for
rates, i. e., the rate as provided in the original franchise as reenacted by the
q See footnote 7, supra.
10 Menefee v. Rankins (1914), 158 Ky. 78, 164 S. W. 365.
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new contract and the rate for the ten year period as also provided in the
second contract. Hence there would be an inconsistency in the same contract,
and the question would arise as to why the whole contract should not become
a nullity because of uncertainty. However, the tendency is for the courts
to hesitate before declaring a contract a nullity for uncertainty."1 In a case
of this kind where there is a general provision that the original franchise
will remain in effect and a specific provision, for rates in the new contract,
which two are inconsistent, the courts will allow the specific to qualify the
general, and the contract will be held binding.12
Another rationalization, and the one which the court seemed to use, is
that the original franchise may be considered as being in effect in its entirety
for the entire period involved in these transactions. The second contract
may then be considered as simply superimposed upon it, and after the
expiration of the second contract the rates of the original franchise would
seem to be in effect.
There is a difficulty, however, that arises as to the court's rationalization.
Since contracts may be partially changed by the provisions of a substituted
contract,iS the fact that the franchise is still in effect, as held in the court'es
rationale, would not seem to preclude the possibility that the rates therein
provided had been abrogated. We have seen that in the case of inconsistent
provisions in two contracts the provisions in a subsequent will supersede and
abrogate those of the former, unless the intention of the parties is shown to be
otherwise.' 4 The mere phrase in the second contract, "under the franchise.
theretofore granted," does not show an intention of the parties that the rates
provided therein should not be discharged. Hence, the logic of a holding
that the rates of the original franchise are controlling because that original
franchise, as such, is still in effect is questionable.
0. E. G.
1113 C. J., sec. 497; 6 R. C. L. 847, sec. 236; Strauss v. Yeager (1911),
48 Ind. App. 448, 93 N. E. 877.
.2Restatement of Contracts, sec 236; Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance
Co. v. Hazelett (1885), 105 Ind. 212, 4 N. E. 582, 55 Am. Rep. 192; Wood v.
Lindly (1894), 12 Ind. App. 258, 40 N. E. 283.
13Restatement of Contracts, sec. 408. (See Indiana Annotations.) Smith
v. Fulton (1882), 85 Ind. 223.
14 Menefee v. Rankins (1914), 158 Ky. 78, 164 S. W. 365.
